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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO 
FRA.NK MAREK and GAYLE MAREK, ) 
) 
) Appellants, 
) Supreme Court No: 38827 
vs. ) 
) 








APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appealed from the District Court of the Second Judicial District in the State of Idaho, 
In and For the County of Clearwater. 
The Honorable Michael J. Griffin, District Judge Presiding 
Counsel for Appellants 
Mr. Paul Thomas Clark 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Counsel for Respondents 
Mr. Mark Snyder 
P.O. Box 626 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
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ARGUMENT 
The Respondents (hereafter ''Lawrence") in their reply brief fail to address the Appellants' 
(hereafter "Marek") argument regarding the District Court's ruling on the Johnson-Adamson Deed 
in the context of the well established law regarding interpretation of deeds. 
The District Court was required to determine first ofall whether or not the Johnson-Adamson 
Deed was unambiguous or ambiguous. While the District Court originally held that the language 
of the Johnson-Adamson Deed was ambiguous, it changed its mind on reconsideration and held that 
the Johnson-Adamson Deed was unambiguous. The District Court then considered extrinsic 
evidence outside the language of the deed. 
This decision by the District Court is clearly erroneous. Where a deed is unambiguous the 
paiiies' intent must be ascertained from the language of the deed as a matter oflaw without resort 
to extrinsic evidence. C&G, fnc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766, 25 P.3d 76, 79 (2001). After finding 
the Jolmson-Adamson Deed unambiguous, the District Court is required to interpret the Deed from 
the language of the Deed and cannot resort to extrinsic evidence. District Court's holding is 
erroneous as a matter of law and should be overturned. The language of the Deed clearly sets the 
boundary of the Marek's property as where the Section 26-27 line lays. method to determine 
where the Section 26-27 line lays is to determine where the Section line actually lays, via a 
survey, the method to determine where the Section 26-27 line lays is not via extrinsic evidence where 
the parties arguably thought the Section 26-27 line lays. 
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Lawrence admits that the legal description is unambiguous but it is the survey that creates 
an "anomaly" because it does not match the extrinsic evidence proffered by Lawrence. Lawrence 
then cites a case which notes that uncertainties in a conveyance should be treated as ambiguities and 
cites to a case where a uncertain point of beginning rendered a deed ambiguous. This case offers no 
support to Lawrence. There is no ambiguity in the Johnson-Adamson Deed. The legal description 
is unambiguous. The boundary is where the Section 26-27 line lays. Considering extrinsic evidence 
against an actual survey establishing where the Section 26-27 line actually lays does not create an 
"anomaly," it undermines the clear unambiguous language of the Deed. 
If the Court were to adopt Lawrence's reasoning unambiguous legal descriptions in deeds 
would be subject to challenge. Surveys would be meaningless. It would not matter where section 
lines actually lay. All unambiguous deeds would be subject to extrinsic evidence. 
Lawrence's claim that Marek does not argue that questions of material fact do not exist is not 
accurate. It goes without saying that Marek contends that the Section 26-27 line lays where it has 
been surveyed, not where Lawrence's claim it is based on extrinsic evidence. Regardless, the 
District Court's holding in this material is erroneous not because of whether or not there where 
questions of material fact, the District Court's holding in this matter is erroneous because it 
considered extrinsic evidence in construing an unambiguous deed, which is clearly in error as a 
matter of law. 
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In Lawrence's second part of its argument, they argue boundary by agreement. That theory 
was expressly rejected by the District Court and Lawrence did not file a cross appeal asserting that 
the District Court was in error in that part of its decision. Thus it is not properly before this Court 
and should not be considered. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred as a matter oflaw by impermissibly considering extrinsic evidence 
after finding that the Deed was unambiguous. Furthermore, the Judgment, and Amended Judgment, 
entered by the District Court in this matter is inconsistent with the District Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order entered on November 22, 2010. Lawrence fails to refute well established law 
regarding deed interpretation and instead asserts a theory that was rejected by the District Court and 
not properly appealed. Lawrence's contention that this appeal is frivolous is incredible given the 
District Court's clearly erroneous application of the law in this matter and given that Lawrence does 
not even address the issues raised by Marek and instead advances a theory that was rejected by the 
District Court and not properly appealed. As such, Marek respectfully requests this Court set aside 
the Judgment, and Amended Judgment, find that the Deed is unambiguous, and enter an order that 
the parties intent must be construed from the plain meaning of the language of the Deed - which sets 
the boundary line as where the Section 26-27 line actually lays. 
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DATED this __ day of October, 2011. 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
(ti§ 
By: 1. 
Paul ThomaMClark, a member of the firm. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _.J __ day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
con-ect copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Mark Snyder 
P.O. Box 626 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
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